2009 NBA Champions: Los Angeles Lakers

June 15th, 2009

Amazing.

Yeah, that was something. Can’t believe our Lakers actually did it!

NBA Championship 2009 - Phil and KobeCongrats to Kobe, Derek, Lamar, Pau, Andrew, Luke, Trevor, and everyone else on the team. Well earned and well deserved. Most of all, congrats to Phil Jackson on his tenth ring as a coach. The psychological and philosophical nuances he’s able to teach his players are above and beyond anything the rest of the league even thinks to mention.

I know a lot of people from the outside looking in aren’t going to see this my way, but for me this was easily the most captivating, most entertaining, most rewarding playoff run i’ve ever watched. It’s difficult to keep all the excitement in check but i really hope Odom and Ariza get paid because i’d love to see this team defend its title at full force.

NBA Championship 2009 - Kobe BryantThis Lakers team isn’t going to challenge the 72-10 record because they’re too dependent on offense and simply not consistent enough defensively. But they can take on anyone and clutch it out when it counts.

To me as a spectator and a supporter, that’s the ideal package – way better than unilateral dominance. We get to see beautiful basketball, high pressure situations, and gritty plays on a regular basis. What more can you ask for as a fan?

But yeah, great season, great playoffs, great ending. Can’t wait to see what happens in the offseason and the next.

I’d just like to say thanks to the Jazz, the Rockets, the Nuggets, and the Magic for so many good games. Deron, Korver, Sloan, Artest, Brooks, Battier, Melo, Chauncey, Karl, Dwight, Rashard, SVG, all great players/coaches and all very cool to watch.

So when’s Kobe making Space Jam 2? Come on WB, let’s get this show on the road!

How Would LeBron Fare in the Triangle Offense?

May 20th, 2009

How does the argument go? “If you put LeBron on the Lakers and Kobe on the Cavs, we’d be Witnessing the league’s first 100-win season.” Pretty good impersonation, right?

Well let’s look at the numbers. But not the ones you’re expecting.

Player Key FG% Key FG
Attempts
Sides
FG%
Sides FG
Attempts
Big Z 54% 280 40% 87
Varejao 62% 340 28% 57
Gasol 62% 759 43% 178
Bynum 59% 433 44% 52

Player Midrange
FG%
Midrange
FG Attempts
Total FG
Attempts
% of Total
Inside
Big Z 44% 309 676 54%
Varejao 36% 97 494 80%
Gasol 41% 106 1043 90%
Bynum 18% 17 502 97%

Phil Jackson is not Mike Brown. He has a complicated offensive system which is designed to get the best out of his players, not just the best out of ONE player. Cleveland’s offensive system relies heavily on Lebron James and James is most effective when he’s driving to the basket either for a layup / dunk himself, or to attract double teams and kick out to open shooters. The NBA Key however, is not that large; not large enough for three offensive big men, and their defenders to all comfortably be in. In order to clear out the key and open driving lanes to the basket for Lebron, the Cavs oftentimes run screen and rolls with Big Z or Varejao in order to draw their defenders away from the rim. They also generally stick Big Z or Varejao away from the key whether or not they are the one giving the screen to Lebron. This tactic of clearing your bigs out of the lane to allow Lebron James to drive is effective for Lebron, but wildly ineffective for the Cleveland’s bigs. No matter how good of a mid range jump shooter Big Z and Varejao are (and Big Z is pretty good), logic says that a big man with post moves will always be more effective in the low block.

Pau Gasol Dominating InsideAnd Phil Jackson, although a Zen Buddhist (not a particularly good friend of logic), understands and accepts this logic. In his system, his two seven footers Bynum and Gasol, play in or around the key almost exclusively. Why do they play around the key almost exclusively? Because Phil realizes that playing inside out, through his big men, and playing his big men to their strengths is just smart fundamental basketball. To be a perimeter player on Phil’s team, you have to have a midrange / long range jump shot because you have to appreciate Phil’s intelligent use of his bigs. That’s why Kobe and Jordan thrive so well under Phil, they have been two of the best mid range shooting guards in league history.

In analyzing the shooting areas for the four big men in question: Varejao, Bynum, Gasol, Big Z, I use three zones:

1) Inside The Key: Refers to all the shots inside the key and below the free throw line
2) The Sides: Refers to the area outside of the key where most big men try to post up their players
3) Midrange: Refers to the area outside the rim between 12 ft and the 3pt line.

I’m not including the three point line because 3 of the 4 have barely shot any 3’s and most of those attempts were to beat the shot clock. Big Z has shot over 30 three pointers this season but for simplicity’s sake, I won’t include those numbers.



It’s important to note that Big Z and Varejao shoot worse from right outside the key than they do from midrange. This is due to the fact that most of their mid ranged shots are wide open and a result of Lebron James’ penetration while most of their shots near the key are due to a lack of success in backing down their opponents and an eventual contested shot. However, a shot near the key is important because it usually indicates that although the Cleveland big men are not that effective, they are posting up and thus working to their strengths in drawing fouls and getting near to the rim. Shooting a mid ranged jump shot negates the ability to get to the line, and in all four players’ cases, makes them far less effective.

Big Z shoots 54% from inside the paint, but only 44% from mid range, yet he shoots more midrange shots in Cleveland’s offense than post-up shots. Big Z is an 80% free throw shooter with a wide array of post moves (as evidenced by his 54.0 FG% from the post). When he’s in the post, he gets fouled and goes to the foul line converting at an 80% rate. If you combine all of Big Z’s shots inside the key with his shots from the sides (often times failed attempts to back down defenders) and compare it to his total shots, Cleveland runs their offense in a way to get 54% of Big Z’s shots in a post up situation. That means that almost half of Big Z’s shot attempts in Cleveland come from the perimeter where he is substantially inferior shooting the ball, and less effective at getting to the line.

Varejao shoots 62% from inside the paint, but only 39% from mid range and a dismal 28% from the sides. Although Varejao shoots 80% of his shots from inside, or near the key, he has still shot 97 shots from mid range. That’s over one shot a game and is clearly not an effective or efficient way for Varejao to play considering that he’s worse than Ilgauskas from mid range, and better than Ilgauskas from inside the paint.

Zydrunas Ilgauskas Jumpshooting OutsidePart of the reason that both of these players are shooting an unusually high percentage of their shots from the perimeter rather than from the key, is because of the Cleveland offensive system, which plays to Lebron’s strengths, and other people’s weaknesses. By clearing the big men out of the key or using them for wing screen and rolls with Lebron, Cleveland is opening up the driving lanes for James to attach. Unfortunately, in doing so, they relegate their two best post players to spots on the floor where their shooting percentages drop by double digits and their free throw attempts all but disappear. If Kobe were to play in Cleveland, his mid range and pull up jumper would allow him to be effective while allowing Ilgauskas and Varejao to play low-post basketball – their most effective kind.

In contrast to Cleveland’s playbook, the Lakers play within Phil Jackson’s Triangle Offense which has long been acknowledged as the most dominant offensive system in the NBA. This is partly due to the fact that the Triangle Offense relies heavily on posting up big men and playing from the inside out.

If we were to compare Gasol to Ilgauskas, two seven footers who have made the All-Star team, have above average free throw shooting, great perimeter jump shots and a wide array of low post moves, Andrew Bynum could be compared to Varejao in having a poor perimeter game with a strong low post game.

Gasol shoots 62% from inside the key, above average in free throws, and a respectable 41% from mid range. Like Ilgauskas he shoots in the low 40% from the sides directly outside the key (in failed post up attempts usually). The similarities in their scoring skill sets make it all the more shocking to find out that Gasol scores from the low post and from directly outside the key with a far greater consistency than Big Z. Gasol shoots 90% of his shots from near the key, or inside the key, whereas Ilgauskas shoots only 54% of his shots in the same area. Considering the fact that Ilgauskas only shoots 3% better from the mid range than Gasol, this GIGANTIC difference between the two in their shot selection can only be the result of a different offensive scheme. On the one hand, Phil Jackson’s offensive scheme consistently uses Gasol in the most efficient way possible, whereas Mike Brown consistently uses his big man in an inefficient manner.

Bynum shoots a shocking 97% of his shots from near, or right next to the rim, whereas Varajeo, although shooting near the rim with more consistency than Big Z, still only takes 80% of his shots from that area.

Although both the Lakers and the Cavaliers have big men that shoot far more effectively from the post than they do from the perimeter, the Lakers do a far better job designing their offense to play towards their big guys’ strengths rather than their weaknesses. The Cavaliers on the other hand, consistently play towards the weaknesses of Ilgauskas, and to a lesser degree, Varejao throughout the game.

This isn’t a coincidence.

Kobe’s complete and polished skill set allows him to be effective as a scorer from the perimeter, enabling his big guys to stay in the low block. Lebron James on the other hand is much more effective near the basket than he is at the perimeter, forcing his big guys out of the key to clear up the congestion.

Essentially, Lebron constant driving to the basket is HURTING his big guys, and making them less effective and less efficient. Now of course it seems that Lebron should drive to the basket because it allows him to score with relative ease and open up opportunities for other players. The problem is that, if he had the mid range skill set of Kobe, he could score with relative ease from the perimeter. And no matter how many wide open mid range jump shots Ilgauskas gets during the course of a game due to James’ penetration, he is still being used inefficiently, because wide open or not, he’s still averaging 10% less from the field than he would be in the post.

Not quite what the King James hype machine keeps telling is to believe, is it?

The Ultimate Do-Or-Die Game 7

May 15th, 2009

Right now, the Houston Rockets are playing out of their minds, every single game. Nobody knows what to think of this underdog team. Sure, the Lakers swept the Rockets 4-0 in the regular season, but this is a completely different lineup presenting completely different matchups. Their speed makes it nearly impossible to keep the veteran Derek Fisher or the recovering Andrew Bynum on the court.

Make no mistake, Sunday’s Game 7 could become the ultimate spoiler to Kobe Bryant’s legacy. There’s no question about it – if Houston somehow finds a way to steal this series, all justifications and explanations will be rendered null and void and the Lakers will be considered the new Mavs.

Think back to the embarrassing 2005-2007 saga of the Dallas Mavericks, which saw them lose to the Miami Heat in the 2006 NBA Finals and then eliminated from the first round of the 2007 Playoffs by the 8th seed Golden State Warriors. That’s one possible fate the Lakers face on Sunday. All sports media operates on 15-second soundbyte opinions which simply isn’t enough room to tell any kind of whole story. The Kobe haters will have a field day with that outcome.

It’s scary.

But it’s also incredibly exciting! Our Lakers sure know how to sell those seats, don’t they? The only downside to all this suspense is having to wait till Sunday for the finale. But at least there’s that Spike Lee movie to look forward to on Saturday.

Go Lakers!!

Why Kobe is the MVP Part 1

March 25th, 2009

John Hollinger wrote an article on ESPN arguing that Lebron James should be the MVP. As usual, he came up with some arbitrary mathematical equations to back up his argument. Now if you know anything about me, you know that I think that Hollinger’s PER system is absolutely absurd. The unfortunate thing is that he still continues to use it, and so do his fans. I do have to say though, I’m pretty pleased with how many people are noticing its stupidity.

Without getting into too much detail, I’ll explain the problem with his PER system. It’s a mathematical formula, and as such, if the results are off, people should abandon it. No one would be using the famous Pythagorean Theorem today if it only worked SOME OF THE TIME. Yet that’s what Hollinger’s system does. It only works some of the time.

The problem with arguing against him in the past however has been the fact that the PER formula is not something that you can actually refute by bringing up facts. I mean don’t get me wrong, Hollinger’s system has a ton of flaws in it.

  • It doesn’t take into account intangibles
  • It sets the standard PER for every season at 15, a completely arbitrary number that Hollinger picked out
  • It doesn’t effectively take into account coaching styles, differences in eras or fatigue
  • It weighs some things more than other things and assigns arbitrary values to certain stats.

The problem though, is that you can’t measure it against something empirical. It’s an individual ranking and you can’t very well measure individual PER’s against real life team success. There could very well be a correlation, but there’s no proof of a cause and effect relationship.

That in a nutshell has been the genius of the PER system, you can’t refute it based on clear cut evidence, you can argue it based on simple logic, but can’t really argue against it using empirical evidence. (Of course you can’t prove it using empirical evidence either because it’s far too flawed, but his followers seem to ignore this). It’s a math formula, so to their worshipping minds, it’s got to be infallible.



That’s where this new article comes into play, John Hollinger has effectively shot himself in the foot today. He did this because he took the individual PER number that was so hard to argue against (because basketball is a team sport) and he used it to create two new metrics: VA (Value Added) and EWA (Estimated Wins Added).

He essentially took the PER and used it to come up with numbers that translate into something we can actually compare to, WINS. Therein, he shot himself in the foot. Now before I explain and show you why he basically made his entire formula null and void, and thus his entire Lebron James for MVP article indefensibly stupid, we have to agree on something.

Math is not an opinion.

Let’s all agree that if a Math formula doesn’t work, we drop it. We don’t continue to use it. Even in statistics, once it’s shown that a formula only-kind-of-sometimes-sorta-works people drop the formula. If you can agree with me that a mathematical formula should work all of the time than continue to read on. If you think that a statistical formula only has to work most of the time and the other times it has to be near the correct answer (hence a spread) then read on. But if you think that Hollinger is right, Lebron’s the MVP, and that all proofs against his formula don’t mean diddly squat, than leave.

Still here?

Ok let’s continue.

Part one of his argument for Lebron centered around the idea that Lebron James may have the best individual season ever by eclipsing Michael Jordan’s record setting PER mark. Since Hollinger chose to introduce MJ, I’m going to use Michael Jordan himself to disprove Hollinger’s entire VA and EWE theory.

According to Hollinger’s calculations for this season, these are the values given to the top 5 MVP candidates:

Player Team PER VA EWA
LeBron James Cavaliers 31.69 843.3 28.1
Dwyane Wade Heat 30.55 795.7 26.5
Chris Paul Hornets 30.06 702.6 23.4
Dwight Howard Magic 25.87 556.6 18.6
Kobe Bryant Lakers 24.88 545.0 18.2

What he’s essentially saying is that Lebron James leads the league in “PER” (his made up statistic that equates to Player Efficiency Rating). Lebron James also leads the league in “VA” (another made up statistic that equates to Value Added). Finally, Lebron James also leads the league in “EWA” (Another made up statistic that equates to Estimated Wins Added).

Value Added and PER are difficult to measure in real life because they are individual characteristics, but EWA is very easy to measure. Just look at the teams record. If the team misses a key player for the majority of, or the entirety of a season, see how much worse they actually do without this key player.

This is another reason why I’m using Michael Jordan. He missed the majority of the season in 1985-1986 and the entirety of the season in 1993 – 1994.

Before I show you the breakdown of Michael Jordan’s numbers I want to explain briefly how, once finding out the player’s PER, Hollinger finds Value Added and Estimated Wins Added.

To find VA (Value Added) Hollinger uses the following formula:

Total Minutes Played in a Season * ([PER - PRL]/67)
  1. PER in this equations stands for “Player Efficiency Rating”
  2. PRL stands for “Player Replacement Level” (which Hollinger puts at 10.5 for both Lebron James and Michael Jordan)
So for an example, lets take a look at the 1990-1991 season. In this season Michael Jordan:
  • Played 3,034 total minutes in the regular season
  • Had a PER of 31.6
So to calculate Michael Jordan’s 1990-1991 VA (Value Added) you would:
  • First: subtract 10.5 (PRL) from 31.6 (Jordan’s PER). The result would be 21.1
  • Second: divide 21.1 by 67. The result would be 0.31
  • Third: Multiply that number (0.31) by total minutes played (3.034). The result would be 955.48
According to this formula, Michael Jordan’s Value Added in the 1990-1991 season would be 955.48

Following me so far? If not, review that again.

If you are, we need to do one last step, find the EWA. To do this, Hollinger explains that you simply need to take the Value Added figure and divide that by 30.

So Michael Jordan’s EWA in the 1990-1991 season would be (955.48 / 30) = 31.85

Using this formula, Hollinger concludes that Michael Jordan was worth roughly 32 wins to his team in 1991.

I followed this formula in order to find the results of Michael Jordan’s PER, VA, and EWA results for two sets of seasons. The two sets of seasons revolve around two events in Michael Jordan’s Career.


Note: As you will see I left out 94-95 season because of all the injuries the Bulls sustained that year, and because Jordan came back to play part of that season. Since Jordan was not in peak physical condition and because the Bulls sustained a ton of injuries, I left that season out.


The First Set includes 4 seasons from 1983-1987
This set starts with the Bulls’ season right before MJ was drafted. I do this in order to see how many wins the Bulls had directly before drafting Michael Jordan, and how many wins Michael Jordan gave them the season he was drafted. The second important comparison here is to see how many wins Michael Jordan gave the Bulls in his third season after missing the majority of his second season due to injury.
Season Jordan MP Jordan PER Jordan VA & EWA Team Wins
1983-1984 Not Drafted Not Drafted Not Drafted 27
1984-1985 3144 25.8 717.96 VA & 23.93 EWA 38
1985-1986 451 30.06 129.91 VA & 4.33 EWA 30
1986-1987 3281 25.87 1038.17 VA & 34.61 EWA 40
Avg 84-87 6876 27.27 628.68 VA & 20.96 EWA 36

As is very noticeable, there is a HUGE discrepency between how many wins Hollinger THINKS Jordan is worth, and how many wins Jordan was actually worth. If we take Jordan’s average EWA over his three seasons (including the dismal 4.33 which is a result of playing only a handful of games that season) we reach 20.96. Yet the average amount of games that the Bulls won with Jordan is 36. Before Jordan was even drafted the Bulls had won 27 games. That’s a difference of 9 games. Hollinger’s formula predicted 21 games.

This means that Hollinger’s formula was 43% correct. In other words, Hollinger’s EWA formula should say “plus or minus 57%” at the end of that. That’s a pretty bad spread.

Ok lets take it on an individual season. In fact, let’s take it on the BEST individual season. Let’s compare the Bulls before they got Jordan (because that was the year with the lowest win total) with the 1986-1987 season (because that was the year with the highest win total).

Ok so, In the 1986-1987 season Jordan had his highest EWA ever, a shocking 34.61. That means that the Bulls should have won 34-35 more games than they did before they even drafted Jordan. In reality however, The bulls sans-Jordan got to 27 wins, and the Bulls in that season got to 40 wins. That’s a difference of 13 wins.

So that means that Hollinger’s system was 38% right. That’s a spread of 62%. Would you EVER higher this guy for your statistics predictions? His estimate missed the mark by 62%.

The Second Set includes the 4 seasons from 1990-1994.
This set starts with the Bulls first championship season and goes on to the Bulls first season without Michael Jordan. Of particular importance in this second set is seeing the difference between the amount of games that the Bulls won during their championship run with MJ, and how many they won during the season that he missed entirely due to his retirement.
Season Jordan MP Jordan PER Jordan VA & EWA Team Wins
1990-1991 3034 31.6 955.48 VA & 31.85 EWA 61
1991-1992 3102 27.7 796.33 VA & 26.54 EWA 67
1992-1993 3067 29.7 878.90 VA & 29.30 EWA 57
1993-1994 Retired Retired Retired 55
Avg 90-93 3067.67 29.67 876.90 VA & 29.23 EWA 62

In all probability the second set should produce more Hollinger-friendly results. The Bulls were winning championships with Jordan in the lineup and his EWA’s weren’t as high as they were in 1986-1987…The EWA accuracy actually gets worse though!

As is very easily noticeable, there is a huge discrepancy between what Hollinger says will happen and what actually happens, again. Hollinger claims that Michael Jordan has an Estimated Win Addition of 29.30 during the 1992-1993 season. If you look at the following season without Michael Jordan, the Bulls only lose 2 fewer games than the previous one with a healthy Michael Jordan. That means that Hollinger was 7% right. His spread for this perticular year was 93%.

If you look at the average Michael Jordan EWA value during his first championship three-peat run of 29.23 games, you don’t see ANY season during which Michael Jordan adds 29 wins to the 55 win record the Bulls had in 1993-1994 without him.Basically, no season from 1990-1991 until Jordan retires in 1993 do the Bulls win 29 more games then they did during the Jordan-less season. Yet that’s what Hollinger’s system predicts.

Even if you take the 72-10 season, the season with the most wins in NBA history…the math still doesn’t add up. MJ’s EWA using Hollinger’s formula for the 95-96 season is 29.6. The difference between 72 wins and the 55 wins that the Bulls had without MJ is only 17. 17 more wins, when the Bulls should have had 29 more wins. That’s barely 60% of Hollinger’s quota, AND THAT’S THE GREATEST SINGLE SEASON WIN RECORD OF ALL TIME. So in Hollinger’s most accurate comparison, his formula was only 60% correct.  I’m not a math guy, but plus or minus 40% is a pretty pitiful spread.

If you do what every statistician is supposed to do, and take an average, it’s actually pretty pitiful…

Jordan’s average EWA during the 3 seasons in the chart is 29.23. The average increase in wins that the Bulls achieved in the three seasons they had MJ versus the one season they didn’t have MJ is only 7. So, divide 7 (number of wins Jordan is ACTUALLY worth on average) with 29.23 (number of wins Hollinger thinks Jordan is worth on average) and you get a measily 24%

Yup, Hollinger’s EWA system should have an asterisk after it that says “plus or minus 75%”. That right there, is perhaps the WORST SPREAD in statistics history. Wait, no it’s not, the 93% spread that Hollinger’s formula resulted in between the 92-94 seasons is the worst spread in history.

Congrats Hollinger, you’ve managed to out-stupid yourself yet again.


Now, notice that I didn’t even argue FOR Kobe, I just argued AGAINST Hollinger’s logic and his formula. By this point, if ANYONE accepts these stupid formulas of his, please go get your head checked.

NBA All-Star Weekend 2009 Highlights

February 16th, 2009

Maybe the side events weren’t as exciting as last year, but i found the marquee All Star Game to be more enjoyable this time around. Let’s face it – the only side event anyone cares about is the Dunk Contest, which has turned into a showmanship competition moreso than a showcase of technical feats.

Dwight Howard is a big man with insane hops and Nate Robinson is a small guard with insane hops. Both are amazing to watch, yet both have been forced to resort to thematic costumes in order to innovate. Hopefully LeBron’s athletic ability can bring a renewed spark to next year’s competition, but knowing him, he probably won’t even practice for it the way that Kevin Durant didn’t bother practicing for this year’s HORSE competition.

The other two events are boring. The Three Point Shootout needs more big names to draw attention. The Shooting Stars competition is based entirely on luck. Worst of all, nobody ever puts any effort into the Skills Challenge, with everyone always looking way too relaxed out there. Despite its meager beginnings, the HORSE competition probably has the most potential in the coming years.


The All Star Game itself was great, even though it started on a strangely serious vibe. When did the roster selection become about winning? All Stars have never been chosen based on win records. This isn’t the MVP where one person is chosen and it’s easy to run with that criteria. You have two separate conferences, so one conference can suck as the East did last year, and suddenly you’re rewarding players on sub-500 teams while denying players on winning teams in the West? It doesn’t make sense.

We know that the media is trying to redefine the MVP award in terms of winning but the All Star Team has always been about uniting the best players in the NBA – the players with the most individual skill and talent, not the ones with the best coaches or general managers. The game itself is proof of this. Even if the players start out serious, there’s simply too much offensive firepower on those rosters. Sooner or later, someone will go on a 20-5 run and then the game turns into a blowout.

What’s the point of pretending that there’s something on the line? Even the All Star MVP Award is more publicity stunt than achievement. The only consideration that players on winning teams deserve is the benefit of the doubt when their stats are slightly lower than top players on one-man show teams.